Enhanced Status Code 5.7.324: Destination DNSSEC Records Invalid
Enhanced Status Code 5.7.324 means “Destination DNSSEC Records Invalid.” The destination domain returned DNSSEC records that failed validation. Because DANE depends on DNSSEC, a broken chain makes the certificate binding untrustworthy and delivery stops.
550 5.7.324 dnssec-invalid: Destination domain returned invalid DNSSEC records
What does 5.7.324 mean?
Microsoft returns 5.7.324 with the text dnssec-invalid, meaning the destination domain returned invalid DNSSEC records. DNSSEC signs DNS responses so a resolver can prove they were not tampered with, and DANE depends on it completely: a TLSA record is only meaningful if the DNS answer carrying it can be trusted.
When validation fails, the sender cannot distinguish a genuine misconfiguration from an active attack, so it refuses rather than guessing. The usual cause is mundane. A key rollover that was not completed correctly, a DS record at the parent zone that no longer matches the child's key, or signatures that expired because a signing process stopped running will all break validation while leaving the domain apparently functional for anyone not validating.
That last point is what makes DNSSEC failures confusing to the domain owner. Most of the internet does not validate, so their website works, their own mail flows, and only senders that do validate are refused. They frequently need to be told, and pointing them at a DNSSEC analyser is more useful than describing the symptom.
How 5.7.324 plays out
5.7.324 rejectionWhere 5.7.324 sits: soft vs hard bounce
| Soft bounce (4xx) | Hard bounce (5xx) | |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | Temporary | Permanent |
| SMTP class | 4xx | 5xx |
| What to do | Let it retry | Suppress the address |
| Recoverable? | Often | No |
| 5.7.324 is | ✓ this code |
What each provider means by 5.7.324
A registered code does not oblige a provider to use it that way, and the large ones diverge. Match the wording in your own bounce, not the definition above.
Common causes of 5.7.324
- A DNSSEC key rollover at the destination was not completed correctly
- The DS record at the parent zone no longer matches the child zone key
- Zone signatures expired because a signing process stopped running
- The zone was modified without being re-signed
- A DNS provider migration lost the DNSSEC configuration
- An algorithm rollover left records signed with a key no longer published
How to fix 5.7.324
- Do not suppress the recipient, since the address is valid and the fault is in their DNS
- Tell the receiving organisation and point them at a DNSSEC validation analyser
- Verify independently with dig +dnssec against their domain
- Check whether the DS record at the parent matches their published key
- Do not disable DNSSEC validation to work around it
- Where you sign your own zone, monitor signature expiry rather than assuming it renews